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Notes
The New York Times Rule:
An Analysis of Its Application
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have been boom times for the law of defamation. The Supreme Court of the United States, not to mention
lower federal and state courts, has entertained many and various
actions for words, both on classical theories of defamation, and on
invasion of privacy theories. It might be expected, as people
crowd themselves closer and closer together by their habits of
breeding and migration, that law cases related to personal umbrage and offense would thrive. But in view of the constitutional
jurisprudence of the last few years, the continuing vitality of
actions of libel is surprising. In 1964 the decision of New York
Times v. Sullivan1 erected stringent new constitutional obstacles
which greatly diminished a defamation plaintiff's prospects for
success if he is a public official. In addition, the Supreme
Court's Times opinion offered a justification for narrowing the
range of libel actions which produced far-reaching ramifications.
The cases following Times have progressively widened the orbit
of first amendment protection on the one hand, and have refined
and qualified the conduct which may not be entitled to protection
on the other. This Note will critically examine the post-Times
cases in the state and federal courts and will suggest the directions in which this constitutional tort rule seems to be developing.
The cases will be considered with especial reference to the two
thorniest problems posed by Times: first, who is disabled by the
constitutional immunity; second, What kind of conduct defeats
this immunity. While this juristic lode has felt many a jurisprudent's mattock, it is hoped that the more recent cases, by
giving content and direction to the ambiguous words of the enunciated constitutional standards, may amply justify the enterprise.
H. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
A. THE Times CASE
In New York Times v. Sullivan,2 the Supreme Court ruled
that the first amendment immunized from liability untrue state-

1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id.
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ments which were defamatory of a "public official" unless that
official could prove, with convincing clarity,3 that the defendant
was animated by "actual malice."' 4 Actual malice was defined as
a knowingly false statement, or a false statement made with
reckless disregard for whether it was true or false.5 This
changed the common law majority rule which had extended the
privilege of fair comment to criticism of public officials., The
fair comment privilege was "designed to permit freedom of critiThus uncism and opinion rather than misstatements of fact."
true statements of fact, even if made in good faith, were not
protected. Furthermore, the fair comment defense had to be
established by a preponderance of the evidence. 8
The facts of the Times case are sufficiently well-known to
permit abbreviated summary. The civil rights activities of Martin Luther King had brought him into opposition with the public
authorities in Montgomery, Alabama. King had been charged
with several "demonstration" offenses. His supporters placed an
appeal, captioned "Heed Their Rising Voices," in the New York
Times to raise money for King's legal defense and to generate
support for civil rights activities in the South. The text of the
advertisement contained a catalogue of outrages against the Negro demonstrators which had supposedly been committed by the
Montgomery authorities. Some of the specifics in that catalogue,
it turned out, had been somewhat misstated. Sullivan, one of
Montgomery's city commissioners, brought an action for libel
against the New York Times and the sponsors of the advertisement, alleging the falsity of the text and damage by innuendo.
The jury returned a half-million dollar judgment for plaintiff
and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. When the case
arrived in the United States Supreme Court, its problem was, as
Professor Paul Freund states, not whether to reverse, but how
to reverse.9 The rule the Court framed took the high ground,1 0
going considerably beyond what was necessary to set aside the
Alabama judgment."
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 285-86.
Id. at 279-80.
Id. at 280.
See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49

COLUM. L. REv. 875 (1949) for a careful review of the pre-Times rules
followed in the various states.
7. Id. at 877.
8. See Goldwater v. Ginzberg, 414 F.2d 324, 341 (2d Cir. 1969).
9. Freund, Political Libel and Obscenity, 42 F.R.D. 437, 493 (1966).
10. Kalven, The New York Times Case, 1964 Sup. CT. Rsv. 191,

209.
11. Id. See also Freund, supra note 9, at 493-94.
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Two theories may be said to underpin the Times result: one,
a theory of reciprocal fairness,'1 2 the other, a theory of democratic self-government. In 1959, the Court had stated in Barr v.
Mateo13 that public officials must have immunity from prosecutions for defamations committed in the course of their duties. On
a theory of reciprocal fairness, a similar immunity would be extended to the private citizen on the ground that it would be unfair to extend a sweeping immunity to public officials without
simultaneously protecting the private citizen from excessive vulnerability. Considering the post-Times enlargement of who
qualifies as a public official, it would appear that reciprocal
fairness was a consideration of no great weight. "The real basis
-the sound basis"'-4 for the Times decision is on quite another

ground.
Inherent in the notion of self-government is the requirement
that the people must have maximum feasible access to information concerning public affairs. It is particularly vital that the
public receive as much information as possible concerning the
characters and activities of public officials. Therefore, all but a
small area of statements purveying such information should be
immunized from liability for defamation. The Court adopted
this position "against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials."'15
A third, unarticulated consideration was obviously also present, a consideration which was probably the prime determinant
in convincing the Court to decide the case in such sweeping
terms. This can be called-perhaps unfairly-the southern jury
problem- In this giddy epoch of social change and concomitant
unrest, certain regions of the nation-notably the Deep Southare unexpectedly separated from the rest of the nation in moral
and psychological terms. Southern juries can be expected to
demonstrate hostility toward Yankees, their journals, opinions
and sympathies. If the state court judgment in the Times case
had been permitted to stand, it might have opened a broad avenue
12. See Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: A
Modern Revised Translation, 49 CoRNEL= L.Q. 581 (1964). Cf. Kalven,
supra note 10.
13. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
14. Pedrick, supra note 12, at 591.
15. 376 U.S. at 270.
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to making repression the routine manner of handling offensive
political ideas in the South-and undoubtedly elsewhere-thus
provoking an endless cycle of estrangement and isolation. The
Court thus had to establish a rule which would provide acceptable standards not only for the Alabama courts but also for every
other court throughout the nation.'" The Court could not allow
regional interpretations, primarily based on racial or regional animosities, to proliferate in the area of first amendment rights. 17

B. EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION: THE Times PROGENY
IN THE SUPREME COURT

While the first major post-Times case in the Supreme Court
resulted in the unsurprising application of the Times rules to include cases of criminal libel,' 8 most of the succeeding modifications were both more subtle and more suggestive. In Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers,'9 the Court adumbrated a future
enlargement of the public official category. It held that a company official must show actual malice to recover for defamatory
falsehoods published about him by a union with which he was
negotiating a dispute. While Linn, strictly speaking, is chiefly
a determination of the scope of section 8 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, its portent of an expanded Times conception of who
qualifies as a public official was promptly fulfilled. In Rosenblatt v. Baer,20 the Court faced a defamation action by the exsupervisor of a New Hampshire recreation area against a reporter who had questioned his professional integrity in a newspaper column. The Court held, in spite of the fact that plaintiff
might not be a "public official" under New Hampshire law, that
he was a public official within the meaning of the constitutional
standard. "[IT] he 'public official' designation applies at the very
least," said the Court, "to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of gov'21
ernment affairs."
In 1967 the "public official" limitation in the Times rule was
construed even more broadly. In Time, Inc. v. Hill,22 the Court
16. Pending at the time the Court decided the Times case were
more than $2 million worth of defamation cases growing out of the same
advertisement. Kalven, supra note 10, at 200.
17. Id.
18. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
19.
20.

383 U.S. 53 (1966).
383 U.S. 75 (1966).

21. Id. at 85.
22. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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extended the Times immunity in the privacy area to a publisher
who had fictionalized an incident in plaintiff's life. The Court
opined, "The guarantees for speech or press are not the preserve
of political expression or comment upon public affairs.... We
have no doubt that the subject of the Life article ... is a matter
Erroneous statement is no less inevitable
of public interest ....
in such a case than in the case of comment upon public affairs, and
in both, if innocent or merely negligent, '. . . it must be protected . . .23
Since Times immunity would disable a plaintiff who had
not volunteered to become an object of legitimate public interest,
it is obvious that it must disable a plaintiff who had voluntarily
thrust himself into the vortex of public debate: so the Court held
in Associated Press v. Walker.24 Edwin Walker, retired majorgeneral and political amateur, had involved himself in ensuring
the continued racial segregation of the University of Mississippi.
A green reporter for the Associated Press wrote that General
Walker had been implicated in some of the violence which resulted from the integration of that University. The Mississippi
jury found the facts to be otherwise and awarded damages to the
general. The Supreme Court reversed unanimously, agreeing that
without a showing of actual malice, General Walker must be denied a recovery. 'Under any reasoning, General Walker was a
public man in whose public conduct society and the press had a
25
legitimate and substantial interest."
While the class of plaintiffs disabled by the Times rule was
thus expanded, the content of the "actual malice" requirement
was more narrowly defined. In the 1965 case of Henry v. Collins,2 6 the Court elaborated on the actual malice requirement,
stating that the plaintiff must show an intent to harm him
through the use of falsehood. The mere presence of ill-will and
falsehood was not enough. 2 7 In St. Amant v. Thompson,2 8 defendant, while a candidate for public office, published a defama23. Id. at 388.
24. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). This result was anticipated in Pauling v.
Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966). In Curtis Pub.
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), decided at the same time as Walker,
the Court reached the opposite result on the question of liability, affirming the verdict of Mr. Butts by a 5-4 majority. An explication of the
several opinions in Walker/Butts may be found in Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 Sup. CT. Rsv. 267, 275.
25. 388 U.S. at 165 (concurring opinion of Warren, C.J.).
26.

380 U.S. 356 (1965).

27. Id. at 357.
28. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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tory article about plaintiff accusing him of criminal conduct.
Plaintiff brought his action on the reckless disregard theory
presented in Times. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice
White stated that for first amendment purposes,
reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated
before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such
doubts shows reckless29disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
In short, the Court in St. Amant seems to be emphasizing that
"knowing falsity" and "reckless disregard" are, rather than alternative theories of actual malice, actually close kindred. In
Greenbelt Co-op Pub. Co. v. Bresler,30 the Court reemphasized
that actual malice, as a constitutional norm, is distinct from
vindictiveness, or personal animus in its common-sense acceptance.
In summary, the subsequent Supreme Court cases have made
two principal modifications in the Times rule. They have expanded from "public official" to "public person" or "newsworthy
person" the class of plaintiffs who will be disabled in most cases
from recovery. They have also restrictively qualified-although
perhaps ambiguously-the definition of actual malice. But, of
course, the real measure of the Times rule as an effective or wellintentioned constitutional doctrine cannot be discerned in the
Supreme Court of the United States alone. Since the Supreme
Court's decisions must be implemented by the lower federal and
state courts, it is to them that one must turn to learn in what
manner the Times rule is functioning.
III.

THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES

A. WHICH PLAINTIFFS ARE UNDER THE Times DISABILITY?
1. The developing cases. 31
The Times case limited the application of the constitutional
principle therein announced to "public officials." But the dis29.
30.

Id. at 731.
398 U.S. 6 (1970).

31. A number of post-Times cases sought to limit the application
of the rule to particularly public persons. Thus, in Afro-American Pub.
Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966), a druggist who was called a
racist for cancelling his subscriptions to the defendant newspaper was
held to be outside the Times disability. In Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 14
N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372, 253 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
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tinction between public officials and other people about whom
public scrutiny is appropriate is only laboriously maintained.
Professor Harry Kalven predicted that the distinction would
fall, 32 and fall it did. In the past two years the courts have repeatedly encountered difficulty in rationalizing the limitation.
While they have recited the Hill formula of "substantial public
interest" in place of the conclusory public official designation,
the courts have been hard-put to remain plausible in their attempts to reflect the evident sense of the Supreme Court that
the Times doctrine should not utterly swamp state rules of
defamation.
In All-Diet Food Distributors,Inc. v. Time, Inc.,33 defendant
published a photograph of plaintiff's health-food store, labelling
it "Food Fads and Frauds." The New York Supreme Court ruled
that the Times rule should apply to the imputation of fraud because the subject was a "highly important matter affecting the
public interest."34 The important case of United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. CBS35 dealt with the same legal problem in a
somewhat more interesting factual setting. CBS broadcast a
documentary film about abuses in the mail-order laboratory business. Plaintiff was not mentioned in the film, but, because it
was a very large mail-order laboratory, it alleged damage and
sought to recover for defamation. The district court dismissed
the action and held that state law forbade a recovery to a member
of a defamed group unless the particular plaintiff was singled
out in some way. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming took a different ground, concluding that the Times rule was
applicable. The court noted that the Times case should not be
regarded as having proscribed any extensions of that immunity
which the decision announced. The court continued:
The crucial question here... is whether First Amendment
immunity can properly be regarded as extending to disclosure
and discussion of professional practices and conditions in the
health area involved, so that those engaged in the particular
field who may claim to have been stained by such a publication will be subject, in any seeking of redress, to application
of the federal standard . . .instead of to the standards of state
916 (1965), a show business personality was not within the Times disability. See also Krutech v. Schimmel, 26 A.D.2d 1052, 50 Misc.2d 1052,
272 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1966); Youssoupoff v. CBS, 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265
N.Y.S.2d 754 (1965). All of these cases may be safely regarded as passe,
in light of the subsequent cases.
32. Kalven, supra note 10, at 221.
33. 56 Misc. 2d 821, 290 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1967).
34. Id. at 824, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
35. 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969).
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libel law....
We have no difficulty in so concluding. 30
The plaintiff argued that it was an inappropriate subject for the
Times disability because it was not a "famous" institution, regularly in the public eye. The court rejected this argument. It
said that although "limelight" (the court's euphemism for public
notice) may be a factor in stimulating a legitimate public interest,
it could not be considered a condition precedent to the existence
37
of a public interest.
In Time, Inc. v. McLaney,38 the Fifth Circuit held that there
could be protected domestic public interest in a person whose
notoriety was derived from activities in another country. Plaintiff was, according to Time, a racketeer who was trying corruptly
to influence the outcome of elections in a certain foreign country.
Plaintiff's conduct, held the court, was such as to make him a fit
object of public scrutiny: that being the case, the Times im39
munity arises and actual malice must be proved.
While cogent arguments can be made for the great public
interest in food, health and politics, even foreign politics, some
of the cases finding a public interest sufficient to demand the
application of the Times rule seem strained. In Bon Air Hotel,
Inc. v. Time, Inc.,40 the district court applied the Times immunity
on facts which, from a common-sense perspective, do not easily
suggest "public interest." Sports Illustrated, in its coverage of
the Masters golf tournament, said certain unflattering things
about Augusta's Bon Air Hotel. It was once a great inn, it was
said, but had now fallen into dilapidation and hard times. Furthermore, according to the magazine, like other facilities in Augusta at Masters time, the Bon Air charged exhorbitant prices.
In finding a public interest in these statements, the court apparently relied on a common law curiosity, the fact that inn-keepers are of a common calling, and thus live lives with a sort of
quasi-public aspect. But the court stopped short of holding that
all persons in common callings are ipso facto under a Times disability in defamation actions, preferring to state its result in
more cryptic terms, i.e., as a conclusion based on particular facts.
36. Id. at 711.
37. Id. at 712. There are indications that the public interest criterion is not limited to the "health" area. Fotochrome, Inc. v. New York
Herald Tribune, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 226, 305 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1969).
38. 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969).
39. See also Holmes v. Curtis Pub. Co., 303 F. Supp. 522 (D.S.C.
1969).
40. 295 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.
1970).
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In Arizona Biochemical Co. v. Hearst Corp.,41 a similar result
was reached. Defendant was the publisher of the Albany (N.Y.)
Times Union. It charged in print that plaintiff was mixed up
with the Mafia. Plaintiff was in the garbage collection business.
Interestingly, the district court found the public interest in the
plaintiff originated with his quasi-governmental activity of garbage collection, rather than pegging the interest upon the prophylactic importance of public discussion of an influential crime
syndicate.42 The court duly noted that, by plaintiff's own averment, garbage collection constitutes "essential services for the
welfare and health of the inhabitants" 43 of the areas served.
Other cases have taken the public interest doctrine still further. In Farnsworthv. Tribune Co., 4" the Illinois Supreme Court
faced a libel action which arose from a Chicago Tribune expos6
of medical quackery in Illinois. Plaintiff, an osteopathic physician, was identified by the expos6 as a quack-in-point, one who
used strange machines, unknown to medical science, for therapeutic and diagnostic purposes. The Illinois Constitution states:
"Truth is a defense in a libel action only when published with
good motives and for justifiable ends." 45 The trial judge took
the position that the Times rule supervened the mandate of the
state constitution and refused to give a jury instruction respecting the purity of defendant's motives. Judgment was entered
on a verdict for defendant and plaintiff appealed. In the Illinois
Supreme Court plaintiff argued that she was an inappropriate
subject for Times disability because she was not known to the
general public prior to the publication of the expose. The court
rejected this argument. Looking to the underlying rationale of
the Times decision and its successors, the disability was said to
apply. "In determining a subject's importance to the public,"
said the court,
we must consider not only the number of persons affected by
41. 302 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
42. Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005 (M.D.

Fla. 1969);

Blanke v. Time, Inc., 308 F.Supp. 378 (E.D.La. 1970). See also Holmes
v. Curtis Pub. Co., 303 F. Supp. 522 (D.S.C. 1969).

43. 302 F. Supp. at 415.
44. 43 flL 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
45. ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 4. The Illinois Supreme Court went on to
hold this section unconstitutional insofar as it would require the publisher of a statement of public interest or concern to demonstrate good
motives or justifiable ends. The Supreme Court of the United States
has never held directly on this point, but if they do, no doubt they
would reach the same result that the Illinois high court did. See Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitation on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN.L. REV. 789, 806 (1964).
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the subject, but also the severity of its impact upon those so
affected. Thus, the fact that plaintiff's personal contacts were
presumably with only a small portion of the public does not
militate against immunity where the publications concern a
matter of such vital importance as the qualifications and practices of one who represents herself as qualified to treat human
ills.46
But, for that matter, what occupation is not "vitally important?" Consider Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,4 7 where the
Philadelphia police raided plaintiff's home and warehouse, intercepting and confiscating a large quantity of what was termed
"smut." Defendant included the item in a news broadcast, referring to plaintiff as a "smut peddler" and to the allegedly obscene literature as "girly magazines." With its tongue presumably in its judicial cheek, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the plaintiff was under a Times disability because of "the
established public interest in the subject matter. ' 48 Because of
the importance of first amendment guarantees, the court went
on, "we conclude that the fact that plaintiff was not a public
figure cannot be accorded decisive importance.""' 0
2.

Does the Times Rule Exclude Any Plaintiff?

If health food peddlers, hostlers, garbage collectors, pornographers and quacks are all such plaintiffs as will trigger Times
immunity, it must follow that the public interest qualification is
no real qualification at all. It explains cases only by a synthetic
contrivance. The class of public figures, as Judge Madden has
pointed out, contains "anyone who is famous or infamous because
of who he is or what he has done."' 0 This raises an important
question. Assuming that "anyone" can be under the Times disability, have the state laws of libel been wholly superseded?
One need not so conclude in order to rationalize the cases: rather,
what the cases do suggest is that it is impossible to tell, merely
by looking at the plaintiff, whether or not he is "public" in a
constitutional sense. The constitutional status of the plaintiff
is determined by examining the defendant's role and conduct.
In other words, instead of there being Times-disabled plaintiffs,
from which defendant's immunity to liability is deduced, there
are rather Times-immune defendants, from which plaintiff's pub46. 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
47. 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 904 (1970).
48. Id. at 896.
49. Id.

50.

Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d

417, 419 (9th Cir. 1968).
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lic status is deduced. The New York Times doctrine has found in
the lower courts a special appropriateness for its name, for it
seems to have become a special constitutional rule for newspapers
and other purveyors of information to the public.
If this proposition is true, then two collateral propositions
may very well also obtain. First, by extrapolation, it may be
said that if a private person may for certain constitutional purposes be "public," then even a public official may, for certain
purposes of the law of defamation, be considered "private."
Second, it would appear to follow that freedom of the press and
freedom of speech may not be co-extensive, and that of the two,
freedom of the press may have the wider scope.
For what purposes could a public official be considered a
"private" individual for purposes of constitutional adjudication? 51 Suppose a United States Senator has, by his official conduct, led one of his neighbors to believe that he is taking bribes.
Suppose further that it is not a reasonable belief, and that, although sincerely believed, it is not true. It is quite clear that if
the neighbor wrote a letter to the editor of the New York
Times, accusing the Senator of taking bribes, the Times rule
would apply to immunize him from liability. But what if the
neighbor embodied the accusation in anonymous phone calls to
the Senator's personal friends and family? Nothing in the rationale of the Times cases suggests that the constitutional im51. In Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc., 389 F.2d 579 (5th
Cir. 1967), a renowned trial attorney, suing for libel, was asserted by
defendant to be a public figure within the meaning of the Times rule
as expounded. The court ruled that it was not enough for the trial
court to determine merely that plaintiff was a public figure.
[A] court confronted with a defamation suit in which the defendant asserts the New York Times privilege is compelled to
make the dual inquiry (1) whether the plaintiff is a public
figure and (2) whether the alleged defamatory publication is
addressed toward his public conduct.
Id. at 587-88. The court goes on to suggest that a public official case
wou]-l be easier to decide than a public figure case because "in the case
of a -ublic figure there is substantially more room for the interplay of
facts oncerning his entry into the public arena and the nature of the
issue n which he has become embroiled." Id. at 588.
F it if the constitutional interest sought to be protected is public discussir i of public issues, the distinction between public officials and
publi, figures would seem to be of dubious utility: the focus should be
on th ! public or non-public character of the debate itself, the identity
of the participants supplying mainly corroborative data. If this analysis
is cor :ect, then the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit, that public figures
and rublic officials present more or less difficult cases in determining
whether a defamation is within the Times rule, is somewhat doubtful.
The rule for determining the public or non-public character of the
debate, regardless of who is defamed, should be the same.
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munity would apply. If the defamer had wanted a robust, uninhibited and wide-open debate on the matter of the Senator's
ethics, he might have had it for the asking. Instead, he chose to
skulk in the chimney-shadows of impropriety, inflicting private
damage on the Senator as an individual, rather than as a public
official. In such a situation, if it is accepted that the Times rule
is a "media" rule, there should be no constitutional impediment
under Times or successor cases to applying state libel laws against
the defamer.5 2 As suggested previously, this result would suggest that freedom of speech is less broad than freedom of the
press. If this is so, there is no justification for it in the first
amendment's language. The words "freedom of speech" and
"freedom of the press" stand in parallel grammatic positions in
the amendment, and, by the copulatio verborum maxim, 53
should be accorded the same priority. Furthermore, and more to
the point, there are no idealogical grounds for differentiating
the scope of the one freedom from that of the other. There are,
however, practical grounds of differentiation which go to the
justiciability of certain issues in the context of the defamation
problem. As Judge Madden says:5 4 a public figure, in the constitutional sense, is somebody who is famous. He becomes famous
because a newspaper or a broadcaster has elected to make him
so. 5 A court cannot assume to gainsay editorial judgment of
52. One case at least, has been found explicitly to state that the constitutional protections of New York Times v. Sullivan and later cases do
not extend to all statements about public officials or candidates for office,
but only those which relate to their official conduct or fitness for office,

and that there may be purely private libels against such persons which
will be governed by state law, unrestricted by the Federal Constitution.
Roy v. Monitor-Patriot Co., 254 A.2d 832, 834 (N.H. 1969). Roy surely

states the principle correctly, but its authority is compromised by the
fact that, on its particular facts, it is clearly a bad decision. The case
arose when defendant published a column of muckraker Jack Ander-

son which asserted that plaintiff, a candidate for United States Senator,

was a small-time bootlegger. The court stated that small-time bootleg-

ging which had occurred "26 to 37 years in the past could be found to

have lost its relevancy to prove the present fitness or unfitness of a candidate." Id. Under the facts thus presented, Roy must be written

off as an aberration. The United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari, 397 U.S. 904 (1970), and presumably will reverse. See also
Arber v. Stahlin, 382 Mich. 300, 170 N.W.2d 45 (1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 924 (1970), another aberration.

53.

"Copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu."

Bacon, iv, 26.

54. 392 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1968).
55. But see Arber v. Stahlin, 382 Mich. 300, 170 N.W.2d 45 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 924 (1970), where the court states: "Of course, the
public figure stature must exist prior to the alleged libel and not by
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newsworthiness; according to the Madden formula, all it can
look to is whether the newspaper has printed a story about a man
"because of who he is or what he has done." That mightily inclusive ground would seem to cover practically every excuse a
newspaper could have for writing about a man. Thus it appears
that newspapers are free to print whatever they will about anyone, so long as they do so without actual malice. But as to one
who seeks to injure another with words in secret, the court
should have more freedom to pass judgment. Because the general
public has been scrupulously excluded from the defamation, the
court may be less concerned with ensuring the vitality of public
debate, the factor which was determinative in the Times case.
Perhaps the most recent post-Times cases could be most succinctly summarized by analogizing them to the common law doctrine of privilege. The common law recognized certain "privileged occasions" when one could publish untrue and defamatory
0
statements about another without incurring liability.A
Such
an occasion would arise from the duty of a publisher, whether
legal or moral, to publish the statements. If the publisher exceeded the bounds suggested by the duty, or if he were guilty
of actual malice, 57 the common law privilege would be held lost
through abuse. Similarly, publication of a story in a newspaper
could be viewed as conclusive evidence of a privilege. Therefore, the plaintiff would automatically have to assume the burden of proving actual malice. No court has yet been found to
go so far; still, there is a certain judicial reluctance to include
any"public" (as distinguished from "secret") publication under
the Times immunity. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how a
disability which comprehends smut peddlers and garbage men
can be kept from comprehending everyone.5
virtue of the notoriety created by it." 382 Mich. at 302 n.4, 170 N.W.2d
at 47 n.4.
56. See, e.g., Watt v. Longsdon, 1 K.B. 130 (1930), which sets forth

this area of the common law with uncommon succinctness.
W. PRossER, LAw oF TORTS § 110 (3d ed. 1964).

See also

57. Actual malice in the common ldw sense of the term is to be
sharply distinguished from New York Times actual malice. At common
law, the term actual malice labeled the conclusion that a privilege to
defame had been exceeded. See W. PuossER, LAw or TORTS § 110 (3d
ed. 1964):
[T]he statement which best fits the decided cases is that the
court will look to the primary motive or purpose by' which the
defendant is apparently ispired .... [Tlhe privilege is lost
if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of
furthering the interest which is entitled to protection.
58. Several credit-reporting cases bring this point forcefully home.
In Serino v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 396 (D.S.C. 1967),
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AcTuAL MAICE

1. A Choice, Not an Echo.
If the successive expansion of the "public persons" category
has been almost irresistible, the development of the actual malice
standard has been far less even and far less clear. This fact is
understandable in that, as defined in the Supreme Court cases,
the standard of actual malice is exceedingly slippery. As refined
by the Henry and St. Amant cases, the Times actual malice rule
would impose liability upon a defendant if and only if he defamed another with a statement intended to injure, and which
he knew to be false or which he published recklessly while entertaining serious reservations as to its truth.
This rule, as stated, is entirely adequate for the consideration
of a limited category of cases-those which deal with what may
be called "simple" facts. A simple fact is one which may be
meaningfully analyzed in terms of truth or falsity. While truth
is generally a defense to libel, not all libels are statements of fact
to which the ascription of truth or falsity has a constant meaning. 59 When columnist Jack Anderson writes in his column that
Senator Thomas Dodd accepted money from a businessman and
then recommended his benefactor's appointment to an important
post in government, it is a statement of simple fact and the Times
rule can meaningfully be applied. 60 But there are other kinds
Altoona Clay Products, Inc. v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 899
(W.D. Pa. 1968) and in Grove v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 308 F. Supp.
1068 (W.D. Pa. 1970), important public policy considerations were seen
as negativing liability for negligent misstatement in credit reports. The
latter two cases explicitly took New York Times rationales, suggesting
more clearly than any other cases have that public interest, rather than
the status of the plaintiff, is the focus of the constitutional rule. These

cases can be distinguished from the run of libel cases generally, however, on the ground that they involve confidential, rather than generally
published statements. Nothing in the rationale of the Times doctrine
suggests cloaking credit reporters in the garb of newspaper reportersthe functions of these two disseminators of information are quite different. Probably the best understanding of the credit cases is as a
branch of commercial law, rather than as a broad and general extension
of the Times doctrine.
59. In Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936), defendant's camera played a trick with perspective; the resulting photograph made plaintiff appear ludicrously malformed, lewd and fantastic.
"Nobody could be fatuous enough," wrote Judge Learned Hand, to believe that plaintiff was as the photograph had represented him. Nevertheless, held: photograph was libelous.
60. See Dodd v. Pearson, 277 F. Supp. 469 (D.D.C. 1967); Dodd v.
Pearson, 279 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1968); Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701
(D.C. Cir. 1969).

1970]

NEW YORK TIMES RULE

of facts which in form are non-public and in nature not subject
to verification. A statement that a senator is mentally unbalanced, or that a hotel is dilapidated and overpriced, or that a
doctor is a quack, is a statement which, although factual in form,
isso intermixed with sentiment that an adjudication of the issue
"truth-vel non" would be fatuous. The common law managed
this problem by attempting to distinguish between fact and
opinion, according privilege to an opinion whose basis was underlying facts which could be said to be true or false. This is not a
satisfying resolution to the problem because the causal link between the underlying facts and the resulting opinion is generally
subjective and obscure."' To say: '"Dr. Farnsworth uses unproved equipment: therefore she is a quack" has no greater
legitimacy than to say, for example, 'r. Einstein spins unproved
theories: therefore he is a quack." The few cases which have
primarily dealt with the actual malice standard have illuminated
the difficulty.
A leading case in the area is Goldwater v. Ginzburg,02 the
first of the major post-Times cases where a conceded public official has prevailed in an action for defamation. Ralph Ginzburg,
the New York publisher, watched the 1964 Republican National
Convention on his television set and in the process formed or
confirmed a low opinion of Barry Goldwater, the Party's nominee
for President. Ginzburg indulged his pique by planning and
producing an "all-Goldwater" issue of his now-defunct magazine
Fact. The October, 1964 edition of Fact, which appeared the
month before. the election, was wholly devoted to the Senator.
Onthe journal's cover appeared the punning legend "Barry Goldwater: the Unconscious of a Conservative." Within were two
articles, both virulent attacks on Goldwater, his personality and
his politics. Although one of the articles appeared under the byline of Warren Boroson, Ginzburg's helper, both articles apparently were written by Ginzburg himself.
The first article stated that Goldwater suffered from "paralysing, deep-seated, irrational fear," and showed "unmistakable
symptoms of paranoia." The term "paranoid" or its adjectival
variants was used at least five times in this article in connection
with the Senator, together with a number of allied passages which
adverted to such things as Goldwater's hostility and his delusional systems. The second article se,t forth the results of a
61. See Titus, Statement of Fact versus Statement of Opinion-A
Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. Rsv. 1203 (1962).
62. 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Ginzburg-conceived questionnaire and contained information
with much the same thrust as that in the first article. The
questionnaire had been mailed to 12,356 psychiatrists, whose
names Ginzburg had procured off a commercial mailing list. It
requested the solicitants to comment on Goldwater's psychological fitness to be President. Only 2417 of the solicitants responded, and of that number, 1749 declined to sign their responses. 1189 of the respondents stated that Goldwater was
psychologically unfit to be President; 571 replied that they had
insufficient information to warrant venturing an opinion; 657
said they believed that Goldwater was sufficiently sound for the
Presidency.
The district court refused defendant's motion for bummary
judgment,6 3 and listed some of the lurid alleged details of the
Ginzburg production which, taken as true, would permit a jury
to infer the existence of actual malice. First, the cover letter
which Ginzburg had sent with the questionnaire alluded to "two
nervous breakdowns" which Mrs. Goldwater was supposed to
have attributed to her husband. Ginzburg had made no discoverable attempt to verify the sense in which the term "nervous
breakdown" was used. Second, in showing how the psychiatrists' letters were signed, Ginzburg used the notation "name
withheld" interchangably with "anonymous," giving rise to the
possible inference that he may have wanted his readers to believe
that some of the unsigned responses had in fact been signed.
Third, Ginzburg had received a letter from the Medical Director
of the American Psychiatric Association which warned in no uncertain terms of the methodological invalidity of the Ginzburg
"survey." Fourth, the Ginzburg article was based on certain
treatises on abnormal psychology. Ginzburg, it appeared, had
never read the treatises himself, but quoted certain passages
which had been underscored for him by others. He also omitted
to print such qualifying language as the treatises contained.
Fifth, in the second article Ginzburg adopted the practice of
"distilling" and "melding" the responses. He engrafted the
words of one response to the words of another, making two letters seem as if one. Some replies Ginzburg printed without including qualifying material. As to one letter, he "didn't even
consider" whether the material was true or false, but cared only
to print what the man had written.
Upon trial, Goldwater obtained the jury verdict. Ginzburg
appealed relying heavily on the secondary nature of the sup63.

Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 261 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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posedly defamatory material. He was merely quoting others, he
argued, and thus he ought to be immune from liability. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals insisted, however, that citing
sources does not insulate a publisher who knows he is repeating
statements which are inherently improbable or false. Having
quoted statements out of context, having melded and distilled
his primary materials, Ginzburg could not claim the exaggerations and distortions were other than his own handiwork.
At the trial, Goldwater's attorneys obtained the expert testimony of Burns W. Roper, the pollster, who testified on the particulars of the invalidity of the Ginzburg survey. Ginzburg argued
on appeal that such testimony was irrelevant because at most it
would tend to establish only "negligence" rather than "reckless
disregard." The court rejected this contention also. Recklessness, said the court, is a constitutionally sufficient basis for proving actual malice, and may be shown by evidence which suggests
a want of due care. Recklessness is "only negligence raised to a
higher power. To hold otherwise would require that plaintiff
prove the ultimate fact of recklessness without being able to
adduce proof of the underlying facts from which a jury could
64
infer recklessness."
Ginzburg was, no doubt, reckless. But the constitutional
standard relates only to recklessness with respect to the truth.
The statement "Goldwater is paranoid" is not, except in form,
a factual statement. It cannot be true or false except in the
roughest, most unsystematic way. The statement "Goldwater is
a paranoid" is a conclusion, freighted with opprobrious overtones
and based upon a foundation, not of fact, but of opinion. The
statement "Goldwater is paranoid" is no more susceptible of
factual verification than the statement "he would have been a
bad President." Perhaps it is to say no more than 'q dislike him."
The difficulty of applying the constitutional standard is not facilitated by relying on questionnaire data, whether trumped-up
or not, since when a psychiatrist states that someone is paranoid,
he is also expressing an opinionative conclusion, formally similar
to the opinion of the layman, with perhaps an added filip: the
sentiment '9 think he ought to behave differently from the way
he does." The ultimate conclusory opinion still lacks a distinctly
factual basis.
A similar sort of problem was presented in Rose v. Koch. 65
Defendant Gerda Koch published a right-wing political newslet64. 414 F.2d at 343.
65. 278 Minn. 235, 154 N.W.2d 409 (1967).
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ter Facts for Action. In the course of one of her issues, she
stated that Arnold Rose, a professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota and retired state legislator, was a communist.
This charge was apparently based on the fact that Rose had been,
many years earlier, an associate of the Swedish political economist Gunnar Myrdal in the writing of An American Dilemma.
Myrdal is a socialist. Rose was a member of the DFL, Minnesota's regular Democratic party. Rose brought an action for libel
in the state district court and obtained a jury verdict for general
and punitive damages. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed and remanded on the principal ground that the jury had
been erroneously instructed. The trial judge, said the Supreme
Court, although he correctly defined actual malice,
incorrectly instructed, in addition, that the jury could consider evidence of personal ill will, the exaggerated language of
the libelous document, the extent of its publication, or any
other factors that the jury might regard as equally relevant.
The latter instruction is neither, on the one hand, a substitute
for the constitutional standard of calculated falsehood or reckless disregard of truth, nor, on the other hand, an appropriate
instruction on the meaning of that standard.66
Upon remand, Rose discontinued the action. The awkwardness
of the truth/falsity formulation of the Times standard is as evident in Rose as in Goldwater. To say of a man that he is a "communist," in this day and age, is hardly to assert a fact. "Communist" has become an epithet, connoting revulsion and condemnation: in the sense that Gerda Koch used the term, it is
sentimental, rather than scientific; it cannot be "false" or "true."
Thus when the court barred the jury from considering the content of the libelous document itself to determine actual malice,
it foreclosed the possibility of finding actual malice at all. Aside
from the language of the document and evidence about the motives of its publisher, there was no relevant data in existenceand there could be none.
In Mahnke v. Northwestern Publications, Inc., 7 the Minnesota high court faced the actual malice problem in a context
where truth or falsity may have some meaning. A re-write man
on the city desk of the St. Paul Dispatch sloppily rewrote a
story which had been telephoned in from a reporter in the field.
The plaintiff, a Minneapolis policeman until his recent death,
brought his action on the reckless disregard theory and won a
jury verdict. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the judg66.
67.

Id. at 251-52, 154 N.W.2d at 421-22.
280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
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ment below, suggesting in its opinion that negligence, which the
conduct of the newspaper's employee certainly was, and reckless disregard lay in adjoining juridical territories. 8 It did not,
however, in its opinion suggest what to look for as the distinguishing factor between the two.
2. The Problems with Actual Malice: In Your Heart You Know
He's Right.
The actual malice problem contains two principal points of
obscurity. First, how can actual malice be found in a statement
which, because it is sentimental rather than factual, can be neither true nor false? Second, assuming a statement which can be
either true or false, how does one distinguish between a negligent
misstatement on the one hand and reckless disregard on the
other?
Prescriptively, it might be thought that Goldwater was
wrongly decided. As has been argued, the statement "Goldwater
is paranoid," buttressed with however much paraphernalia and
psychiatric gew-gaws, is never more than a contumelous sentiment. That being true, it cannot fit into the Times definition
of actual malice. But in another sense, it might be said that
Goldwater expresses a modification of the Times doctrine relating
to the-outrageousness of defendant's conduct. This modification
would state that, the Times rule notwithstanding, atrocious activity on the part of defendant is apt to affix liability. Roughly
equivalent to this supposed modification is the rule relating to
the tortious infliction of emotional distress propounded by the
Second Restatement of Torts. The Restatement says:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts
to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment 69against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
The Restatement adds that such conduct includes not merely intentional conduct, but also reckless conduct "in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress
70
Will folOW.
While the "outrageous" test might be a humane qualification
68. Id. at 343, 160 N.W.2d at 10-11.
69. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToaRs § 46, comment d (1965).
70. Id. at comment i
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to the Times rule, there are several reasons which militate against
its overt adoption, if not its covert acceptance. First, insofar as
the "outrageous" formula is subjective, it depends upon the
caprice of a judge or jury, and thus may exercise a chilling effect
on important first amendment rights. This factor would not be
determinative without reference to the interest sought to be protected. If people subject to the courts of the United States can
stand any words, they can stand those which are merely expressive of opinion. The second consideration which would inhibit
the adoption of this qualification to the Times rule is the previously-mentioned "southern jury problem," and the need for
transnational consistency in the application of constitutional
principles. The Times rule itself, after all, was originally a response to the "outrage" of the Alabama jury which tried the case.
The second problem in the actual malice area relates to the
difficulty of drawing a line between reckless disregard and negligent misstatement. While the true/false language of the Times
standard is at least meaningful in this area, the problem of how
to draw the negligence/recklessness distinction remains. This
problem assumes a statement of simple fact-a statement which
can be true or false. Further, it assumes that it is false. Unless
libel suits are to be eliminated altogether, the matter of linedrawing must be faced. Both Goldwater and Mahnke suggest
that negligence and recklessness are principally to be distinguished on quantitative grounds-that is, that recklessness is just
a great deal of negligence. The St. Amant case hints that there
may be a qualitative distinction as well, going to the state of
mind of the defendant, that is, his reservations, or lack thereof,
about the truth of the defamations he published.
The difficulty of line-drawing could possibly be simplified
by the application of the "outrageous" formula to the question
of whether a negligent misstatement amounted to a reckless disregard as well. If, in light of all the circumstances in the case
-the conduct of the defendant and the contents of the libelthe jury concluded that the false statement of the defendant
was beyond the bounds of what can be tolerated in a civilized
community, and was atrocious, then liability could be imposed.
This test would be vulnerable to substantially the same attack
that was expounded against the use of the outrageous formula
in connection with the possible sotto voce modification of the
Times rule. But a distinction between the two problems exists.
There seems to be no compelling reason to suppose that sentimental words need to be actionable. But unless one adopts the
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extreme position that no language is actionable and that the laws
of defamation are unconstitutional, 7 ' distinction between reckless disregard and negligent misstatement must be made, on one
or another ground. The "outrageous" formula focuses precisely
on those defamations which are the most despicable, interdicting
precisely that behavior which should be deterred.72
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Times rule in certain respects has outgrown
itself; but in other respects, it is embroiled in confusion. The limitation of the Times rule to publicly interesting plaintiffs may
confidently be said to be nearing total elimination, barring a
drastic change in the rule. Thus it is probable that at some time
in the near future proving actual malice will be a requirement
for every plaintiff who seeks a recovery for defamatory words.
But the definition of actual malice itself has presented problems,
if only semantic ones, which seem nearly insoluble. The use of
the truth/falsity distinction for epithets like "communist" or
"paranoid" has produced an uncomfortable murkiness in this
area. Nor is it clear how negligence and reckless disregard are to
be distinguished. The use of the "outrageous" formula suggested
in this Note may offer some aid; yet the formula may be more
suitable to curbstone punditry than to constitutional jurisprudence. Since the "public interest" limitation is nearly a moribund problem, it is the definition and operation of the standards
for actual malice which should occupy courts as they face defamation cases in the future.
71. Not even Mr. Justice Black would go so far. See, for example,
his opinion concurring and dissenting in Rosenblatt v. Baer: "IT]he
only sure way to protect speech and press... is to recognize that libel
laws are abridgments of speech and press and therefore are barred in
both federal and state courts by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
383 U.S. at 95. He indicated, however, that he would hold out for the
minimum limitation that the wholly-protected speech relate to "public
affairs." Id.
72. Cf. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir.
1966), where columnist Drew Pearson had accused Congressman Eugene Keogh of New York of substantial misconduct. The district court
refused the Post's motion for summary judgment and certified the case
because of a doubt about the proper application of the law to the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals for an interlocutory appeal. The court reversed the trial court and ordered the entry of a summary judgment for
defendant. The court argued that there is no basis, in experience or in
the Times case, for asserting that the more serious the accusation, the
higher the duty of the publisher to ensure that it is true before it is
published. On the contrary, argued the court, it is the accusations of
greatest gravity which we have most warrant for not discouraging.
Id at 972.

